Primary Documents Lesson Plan

I. New Jersey Core Curriculum Standard

6.4.12 J6 - “use of the Atom Bomb”


II. Essential Questions Addressed by the Lesson

• Was the use of atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki necessary to bring about the surrender of Japan?

- Did the bombs’ use significantly shorten the war?
- Did the bombs’ use enable the United States to avoid an invasion of Japan?
- When the Truman administration asserted that the bombs’ use prevented half a million American casualties that would have resulted from the invasion, were such claims accurate?
- What role did the United States’ insistence on Japan’s unconditional surrender play in determining the manner in which World War II ended?
- Was the decision to use the atomic bomb based on political priorities in any way? If so, how?

• Do concerns of military necessity and national security take absolute precedence over all other issues during wartime?

• To what extent should a nation’s conduct in war be governed by considerations of morality and international law?

• Generally speaking, do the ends justify the means?


III. Background Information

The first order document was written by one of the key decision makers in the Truman administration as part of an effort to stem growing criticism of the bomb's use and to foster public support for America's use of the atomic bomb in Japan and for future U.S. atomic policy overall. In doing so, this document (along with a few others published by administration officials) served to solidify the prevailing and dominant discourse about Hiroshima and Nagasaki which was and continues to be largely accepted and advanced by the U.S. government, history textbooks in America, and the majority of Americans themselves. From that point on, most of the discussion and debate about the issue of the atomic bombings was either supportive or critical of the basic assertions contained in the Stimson piece.

The official and dominant narrative was based upon several factors, including:

1. An emphasis upon the "unconditional surrender" of Japan as being necessary for long-term peace in the region and the world.

2. A view that alternatives to using the atomic bomb would not have been as effective in bringing about Japan's surrender. These included continued conventional bombings by air and sea, an invasion of Japan, waiting for the Russians to enter the war, and a demonstration of the atomic bomb's destructiveness in an unpopulated area.

3. A belief that an invasion of Japan would result in several hundreds of thousands of American casualties.


IV. Documents


FIRST ORDER DOCUMENT

Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War from 1940-1945
The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb - Harper's Magazine - February 1947 (excerpts)

"At no time, from 1941 to 1945, did I ever hear it suggested by the President, or by any other responsible member of the government, that atomic energy should not be used in the war. ... We were at war, and the work must be done. I therefore emphasize that it was our common objective, throughout the war, to be the first to produce an atomic weapon and use it. The possible atomic weapon was considered to be a new and tremendously powerful explosive, as legitimate as any other of the deadly explosive weapons of modern war.

.....

On June 1 [1945], ... the Interim Committee unanimously adopted the following recommendations:

(1) The bomb should be used against Japan as soon as possible.
(2) It should be used on a dual target - that is, a military installation or war plant surrounded by or adjacent to houses and other buildings most susceptible to damage, and
(3) It should be used without prior war [of the nature of the weapon].

In reaching these conclusions the Interim Committee carefully considered such alternatives as a detailed advance warning or a demonstration in some uninhabited area. Both of these suggestions were discarded as impractical. They were not regarded as likely to be effective in compelling a surrender of Japan, and both of them involved serious risks. Even the New Mexico test would not give final proof that any given bomb was certain to explode when dropped from an airplane. Quite apart from the generally unfamiliar nature of atomic explosives, there was the whole problem of exploding a bomb at a predetermined height in the air by a complicated mechanism which could not be tested in the static test of New Mexico. Nothing would have been more damaging to our effort to obtain surrender than a warning or a demonstrationg followed by a dud - and this was a real possibility. Furthermore, we had no bombs to waste. It was vital that a sufficient effect be quickly obtained with the few we had.

.....

The committee's function was, of course, purely advisory. The ultimate responsibility for the recommendation to the president rested upon me, and I have no desire to veil it. The conclusions of the committee were similar to my own, although I reached mine independently. I felt that to extract a genuine surrender from the Emperor and his military advisers, they must be administered a tremendous shock which would carry convincing proof of our power to destroy the Empire. Such an effective shock would save many times the number of lives, both American and Japanese, that it would cost.

.....

The principal political, social, and military objective of the United States in the summer of 1945 was the prompt and complete surrender of Japan. Only the complete destruction of her military power could open the way to lasting peace.

Japan, in July 1945, had been seriously weakened by our increasingly violent attacks. It was known to us that she had gone so far as to make tentative proposals to the Soviet government, hoping to use the Russians as mediators in a negotiated peace. These vague proposals contemplated the retention by Japan of important conquered areas and were therefore not considered seriously. There was as yet no indication of any weakening in the Japanese determination to fight rather than accept unconditional surrender. If she should persist in her fight to the end, she had still a great military force.

.....

As we understood it in July, there was a very strong possibility that the Japanese government might determine upon resistance to the end, in all the areas of the Far East under its control. In such an event the Allies would be faced with the enormous task of destroyed an armed force of five million men and five thousand suicide aircraft, belonging to a race which had already amply demonstrated its ability to fight literally to the death.

The strategic plans of our armed forces for the defeat of Japan, as they stood in July, had been prepared without reliance upon the atomic bomb, which had not yet been tested in New Mexico. We were planning an intensified sea and air blockade, and greatly intensified strategic air bombing, through the summer and early fall, to be followed on November 1 by an invasion of the southern island of Kyushu. This would be followed in turn by an invasion of the main island of Honshu in the spring of 1946. The total U.S. military and naval force involved in this grand design was of the order of 5,000,000 men; if all those indirectly concerned are included, it was larger still.

We estimated that if we should be forced to carry this plan to its conclusion, the major fighting would not end until the latter part of 1946, at the earliest. I was informed that such operations might be expected to cost over a million casualties, to American forces alone. Additional large losses might be expected among our allies, and, of course, if our campaign were successful and if we could judge by previous experience, enemy casualties would be much larger than our own.

It was already clear in July that even before the invasion we should be able to inflict enormously severe damage on the Japanese homeland by the combined application of "conventional" sea and air power. The critical question was whether this kind of action would induce surrender. It therefore became necessary to consider very carefully the probable state of mind of the enemy, and to assess with accuracy the line of conduct which might end his will to resist.

.....

On July 28 the Premier of Japan, Suzuki, rejected the Potsdam ultimatum by announcing that it was "unworthy of public notice." In the face of this rejection we could only proceed to demonstrate that the ultimatum had meant exactly what it said when it stated that if the Japanese continued the war, "the full application of our military power, backed by our resolve, will mean the inevitable and complete destruction of the Japanese armed forces and just as inevitably the utter devastation of the Japanese homeland."

For such a purpose the atomic bomb was an eminently suitable weapon. The New Mexico test occurred while we were at Potsdam, on July 16. It was immediately clear that the power of the bomb measured up to our highest estimates. We had developed a weapon of such a revolutionary character that its use against the enemy might well be expected to produce exactly the kind of shock on the Japanese ruling oligarchy which we desired, strengthening the position of those who wished peace, and weakening that of the military party.

.....

Hiroshima was bombed on August 6, and Nagasaki on August 9. These two cities were active working parts of the Japanese war effort. One was an army center; the other was naval and industrial. Hiroshima was the headquarters of the Japanese Army defending southern Japan and was a major military storage and assembly point. Nagasaki was a major seaport and it contained several large inudstrial plants of great wartime importance. We believed that our attacks had struck cities which must certainly be important to the Japanese military leaders, both Army and Navy, and we waited for a result. We waited one day."

SECOND ORDER DOCUMENT #1

UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
SUMMARY REPORT
(Pacific War)

WASHINGTON, D.C.
1 JULY 1946
excerpt from page 26:

"There is little point in attempting precisely to impute Japan's unconditional surrender to any one of the numerous causes which jointly and cumulatively were responsible for Japan's disaster. … Nevertheless, it seems clear that, even without the atomic bombing attacks, air supremacy over Japan could have exerted sufficient pressure to bring about unconditional surrender and obviate the need for invasion.

Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts, and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945, and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated."

SECOND ORDER DOCUMENT #2

Dr. Karl T. Compton - physicist, president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and member of the Interim Committee appointed to advise President Harry Truman on the use of the atomic bomb.

If The Atomic Bomb Had Not Been Used - Atlantic Monthly - December 1946 (excerpts)

"It is easy now, after the event, to look back and say that Japan was already a beaten nation, and to ask what therefore was the justification for the use of the atomic bomb to kill so many thousands of helpless Japanese in this inhuman way; furthermore, should we not better have kept it to ourselves as a secret weapon for future use, if necessary? This argument has been advanced often, but it seems to me utterly fallacious.

I had, perhaps, an unusual opportunity to know the pertinent facts from several angles, yet I was without responsibility for any of the decisions. I can therefore speak without doing so defensively. While my role in the atomic bomb development was a very minor one, I was a member of the group called together by Secretary of War Stimson to assist him in plans for its test, use, and subsequent handling. Then, shortly before Hiroshima, I became attached to General MacArthur in Manila, and lived for two months with his staff. In this way I learned something of the invasion plans and of the sincere conviction of these best-informed officers that a desperate and costly struggle was still ahead. Finally, I spent the first month after V-J Day in Japan, where I could ascertain at first hand both the physical and the psychological state of that country.

From this background I believe, with complete conviction, that the use of the atomic bomb saved hundreds of thousands—perhaps several millions—of lives, both American and Japanese; that without its use the war would have continued for many months; that no one of good conscience knowing, as Secretary Stimson and the Chiefs of Staff did, what was probably ahead and what the atomic bomb might accomplish could have made any different decision. Let some of the facts speak for themselves.

Was the use of the atomic bomb inhuman?

All war is inhuman. Here are some comparisons of the atomic bombing with conventional bombing. At Hiroshima the atomic bomb killed about 80,000 people, pulverized about five square miles, and wrecked an additional ten square miles of the city, with decreasing damage out to seven or eight miles from the center. At Nagasaki the fatal casualties were 45,000 and the area wrecked was considerably smaller than at Hiroshima because of the configuration of the city.

Compare this with the results of two B-29 incendiary raids over Tokyo. One of these raids killed about 125,000 people, the other nearly 100,000."

.....

Was Japan already beaten before the atomic bomb?

The answer is certainly 'yes' in the sense that the fortunes of war had turned against her. The answer is 'no' in the sense that she was still fighting desperately and there was every reason to believe that she would continue to do so; and this is the only answer that has any practical significance.

General MacArthur's staff anticipated about 50,000 American casualties and several times that number of Japanese casualties in the November 1 operation to establish the initial beachheads on Kyushu. After that they expected a far more costly struggle before the Japanese homeland was subdued. There was every reason to think that the Japanese would defend their homeland with even greater fanaticism than when they fought to the death on Iwo Jima and Okinawa. No American soldier who survived the bloody struggles on these islands has much sympathy with the view that battle with the Japanese was over as soon as it was clear that their ultimate situation was hopeless. No, there was every reason to expect a terrible struggle long after the point at which some people can now look back and say, 'Japan was already beaten.'

.....

Did the atomic bomb bring about the end of the war?

That it would do so was the calculated gamble and hope of Mr. Stimson, General Marshall, and their associates. The facts are these. On July 26, 1945, the Potsdam Ultimatum called on Japan to surrender unconditionally. On July 29 Premier Suzuki issued a statement, purportedly at a cabinet press conference, scorning as unworthy of official notice the surrender ultimatum, and emphasizing the increasing rate of Japanese aircraft production. Eight days later, on August 6, the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima; the second was dropped on August 9 on Nagasaki; on the following day, August 10, Japan declared its intention to surrender, and on August 14 accepted the Potsdam terms.

On the basis of these facts, I cannot believe that, without the atomic bomb, the surrender would have come without a great deal more of costly struggle and bloodshed.

Exactly what role the atomic bomb played will always allow some scope for conjecture. A survey has shown that it did not have much immediate effect on the common people far from the two bombed cities; they knew little or nothing of it. The even more disastrous conventional bombing of Tokyo and other cities had not brought the people into the mood to surrender.

The evidence points to a combination of factors. (1) Some of the more informed and intelligent elements in Japanese official circles realized that they were fighting a losing battle and that complete destruction lay ahead if the war continued. These elements, however, were not powerful enough to sway the situation against the dominating Army organization, backed by the profiteering industrialists, the peasants, and the ignorant masses. (2) The atomic bomb introduced a dramatic new element into the situation, which strengthened the hands of those who sought peace and provided a face-saving argument for those who had hitherto advocated continued war. (3) When the second atomic bomb was dropped, it became clear that this was not an isolated weapon, but that there were others to follow. With dread prospect of a deluge of these terrible bombs and no possibility of preventing them, the argument for surrender was made convincing. This I believe to be the true picture of the effect of the atomic bomb in bringing the war to a sudden end, with Japan's unconditional surrender.

If the atomic bomb had not been used, evidence like that I have cited points to the practical certainty that there would have been many more months of death and destruction on an enormous scale.



THIRD ORDER DOCUMENT #1

Statements by Dwight D. Eisenhower

“During his recitation of the relevant facts [that the atomic bomb would be used], …I voiced to him [Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson] my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropped the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives. It was my belief that Japan was, at that very moment, seeking some way to surrender with a minimum loss of ‘face.’”

- Eisenhower’s memoirs – Mandate for Change 1953-1956 (Garden City, 1963), 312-13.


“It wasn’t necessary to hit them with that awful thing.”

- “Ike on Ike,” Newsweek, November 11, 1963, p. 107.



THIRD ORDER DOCUMENT #2

excerpt from Winston Churchill’s memoirs:

“I had in my mind the spectacle of Okinawa island, where many thousands of Japanese, rather than surrender, had drawn up in line and destroyed themselves by hand-grenades after their leaders had solemnly performed the rite of hara-kiri. To quell the Japanese resistance . . . might well require the loss of a million American lives and half that number of British. . . . Now all this nightmare picture had vanished. In its place was the vision – fair and bright indeed it seemed – of the end of the whole war in one or two violent shocks. . . . To avert a vast, indefinite butchery, to bring the war to an end, to give peace to the world, to lay healing hands upon its tortured peoples by a manifestation of overwhelming power at the cost of a few explosions, seemed, after all our toils and perils, a miracle of deliverance.”

Winston Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. 6, Triumph and Tragedy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1953), 638-639.



THIRD ORDER DOCUMENT #3

The Grew Memo

Department of State

Memorandum of Conversation - May 28, 1945

Participants:
President Truman
Judge Samuel Rosenman [Special Counsel to the President]
Joseph Grew [Acting Secretary of State, Jan. to Aug. 1945 & U.S. Ambassador to Japan 1932-1941 ]

"After a conference this morning with Judge Rosenman I went with the Judge to see the President and set forth the purpose of our visit as follows:

In waging our war against Japan it is an elementary and fundamental concept that nothing must be sacrificed, now or in future, to the attainment and maintenance of our main objective, namely to render it impossible for Japan again to threaten world peace. This will mean the destruction of Japan's tools for war and of the capacity of the Japanese again to make those tools. Their military machine must be totally destroyed and, so far as possible, their cult of militarism must be blotted out.

With the foregoing fundamental concepts as a premise it should be our aim to accomplish our purpose with the least possible loss of American lives. We should, therefore, give most careful consideration to any step which, without sacrificing in any degree our principles or objectives, might render it easier for the Japanese to surrender unconditionally now.

.....

The greatest obstacle to unconditional surrender by the Japanese is their belief that this would entail the destruction or permanent removal of the Emperor and the institution of the Throne. If some indication can now be given the Japanese that they themselves, once thoroughly defeated and rendered impotent to wage war in future, will be permitted to determine their own future political structure, they will be afforded a method of saving face without which surrender will be highly unlikely.

It is believed that such a statement would have maximum effect if issued immediately following the great devastation of Tokyo which occurred two days ago. The psychological impact of such a statement at this particular moment would be very great.

.....

The idea of depriving the Japanese of their Emperor and Emperorship is unsound for the reason that the moment our backs are turned (and we cannot afford to occupy Japan permanently) the Japanese would undoubtedly put the Emperor and Emperorship back again. From the long range point of view the best that we can hope for in Japan is the development of a constitutional monarchy, experience having shown that democracy in Japan would never work.

Those who hold that the Emperor and the institution of the throne in Japan are the roots of their aggressive militarism can hardly be familiar with the facts of history. For approximately 300 years the Japanese Emperors were deprived of their throne in practice and were obliged to eke out a precarious existence in Kyoto while the Shoguns who had ejected them ruled in Tokyo and it was the Shogun Hideyoshi who in the sixteenth century waged war against China and Korea and boasted that he would conquer the world.

The Emperor Meiji who brought about the restoration of the throne in 1868 was a strong man who overcame the militaristic Shoguns and started Japan on a moderate and peaceful course. The Emperors who followed Meiji were not strong men and it became relatively easy for the military extremists to take control and to exert their influence on the Emperors. If Hirohito had refused to support the military and approve the declaration of war in 1941, he would in all probability have suffered the fate of his predecessors. In any case whether he was or was not war minded he would have been powerless to stem the tidal wave of military ambition.

The foregoing facts indicate clearly that Japan does not need an Emperor to be militaristic nor are the Japanese militaristic because they have an Emperor. In other words, their militarism springs from the military clique and cult in the country which succeeded in gaining control even of the Emperor himself and rendered powerless the Emperor's advisers, who in the years before Pearl Harbor were doing their best to retrain the hotheads. The assassinations in February 1936 were undertaken by the military extremists for the specific purpose of purging the peace-minded advisers around the throne. General Tojo and his group who perpetrated the attack on Pearl Harbor were just as much military dictators as were the Shogun in the old days and the Emperor was utterly powerless to retrain them regardless of his own volition.

The foregoing facts do not in any way clear Hirohito from responsibility for the war for, having signed the declaration of war, the responsibility was squarely on his shoulders. The point at issue is that the extremist group would have had their way whether the Emperor signed or not. Once the military extremists have been discredited through defeat the Emperor, purely a symbol, can and possibly will be used by new leaders who will be expected to emerge once the Japanese people are convinced that their military leaders have let them down. The institution of the throne can, therefore, become a cornerstone for building a peaceful future for the country once the militarists have learned in the hard way that they have nothing to hope for in the future."

V. Student-Centered Activity

Students will be asked to complete the following assessment* of each document:

1. Who is the author and when was it written?

2. Is the document a primary or secondary source? Does this make it more or less reliable?

3. How does this source support or reject Truman's decision to use the bomb?

4. How does this source support or contradict other sources?

5. What does the author's perspective/audience tell you about his/her possible intentions and/or biases?

*these student investigation prompts were adapted from
Frans H. Doppen, "Teaching and Learning Multiple Perspectives:
The Atomic Bomb," The Social Studies (July/August 2000): 159-169.


In addition, students will write a brief reaction (2-3 paragraphs) that addresses the following question:

Has your view of this issue changed from what it was after only reading the textbook's coverage of it? If so, how? In what ways did reading primary sources contribute to this change, if at all?